

# Schweser Review Workshop Mind Maps

Private Wealth

2026

Level III CFA®

SCHWESER REVIEW WORKSHOP MIND MAPS: PRIVATE WEALTH  
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# Asset Allocation

# Asset Allocation

# **Capital Market Expectations Part 1: Framework and Macro Considerations**

## Capital Market Expectations

- Apply economic tools and concepts to the formation of capital market expectations
- This is a collection of applied economic concepts
  - Not the economic theory of Levels I and II

Client objectives and constraints  
+ **capital market expectations**  
( **$E(R)$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $\rho$  of asset classes**)  
→ SAA

- You should not expect any forecasting tool for risky assets to work consistently at all times
- Multiple tools are likely to lead to differing conclusions
  - Providing valuable insight into market consensus or lack of consensus

## Formulating Capital Market Expectations


### Challenges in Forecasting

1. Limitations to using economic data  
*(lags, revisions, methodologies, index rebasing)*
  2. Data measurement *(transcription errors, survivorship bias, appraisal (smoothed) data)*
  3. Limitations of historical estimates—*how long a data set to use? (problem of regime changes)*
  4. *Ex post* (realized) risk can lead us to underestimate *ex ante* (anticipated) risk
  5. Biased methods *(data mining, time period bias)*
  6. Failing to account for conditioning information *(e.g., beta might vary through the business cycle)*
  7. Misinterpretation of correlations
  8. Psychological biases
  9. Model, parameter, and input uncertainty
- Anchoring *(to initial data, impressions, estimates)*
  - Status quo *(forecast based on recent past)*
  - Confirmation
  - Overconfidence
  - Prudence *(avoid extreme forecasts)*
  - Availability *(events that have left a strong impression/are easy to recall)*

## Economic Growth

Slope represents the trend rate of growth over time; a change in slope is a change in rate of growth

*Over the LT, average bond returns and equity capital appreciation returns must be anchored to trend growth*



Output gap—associated with declining rate of inflation

Basic model forecasts trend growth as **sum** of:

- Growth in labor input
- Population growth *plus* labor force participation growth
- Growth in capital per worker
- Growth in total factor productivity (TFP)

**Exogenous** (unanticipated) shocks can disrupt trend growth

- Government policy changes, political events, technological progress, natural disasters, new natural resources, financial crises

## Forecasting Approaches

### **Econometrics** (multiple regression)

- Complex and time-consuming
- Historical relationship among variables used to forecast
- Structural and reduced form (looser connection to theory, may be purely data-driven) variants
- Danger: estimation errors and changes in relationships (e.g., regime changes)


### **Economic indicators**, simple and available

- Leading (also coincident, lagging)
- Prime focus on identifying turning points
- Diffusion index measures proportion of indicators pointing up/down
- Can generate false signals
- Revisions may overfit past data and reduce reliability of forward forecasts

### **Checklist** approach

- Simple but subjective and time-consuming

## Business Cycles Phases



## Business Cycles Phases

### Slowdown

- Rising rates, fewer viable investments, accumulated debt
- Business confidence wavers
- Inflation still increasing
- Govt. policy turning neutral
- ST and LT rates peaking and then decline—yield curve may invert (esp. if central bank continues to push up ST rates)
- Credit spreads widen (esp. weaker credits)
- Stocks declining

### Contraction (typically 12–18 months)

- Business confidence weak, investment spending drops, major corporate failures
- Govt. policy easing; profits drop sharply
- Credit spreads widen until signs of turn
- ST and LT rates declining—yield curve steepens substantially
- Stocks decrease, but increase in later stages anticipating the economic turn

### Market expectations and the business cycle—issues

- Phases are variable in length and amplitude
- Hard to distinguish between cyclical and secular (longer-term) effects
- How markets respond to business cycle as uncertain as cycle itself
- Inflation expectations tend to be countercyclical

## Inflation

- Widely believed that outright deflation damages the economy (nominal debt more onerous to service, and reduced effectiveness of stimulative monetary policy)
- Moderate inflation seen to impose only modest costs on economy

### **Inflation within expectations**

- Cash: earn real rate of interest
- Bonds: ST yields rise/fall more than LT yields
- Equity: no impact given predictable economic growth
- Real estate: neutral with typical returns

### **Inflation above expectations**

- Cash: does well, with increasing yield
- Bonds: does poorly as prices decline (nominal bonds only)
- Equity: does poorly, with exceptions for companies able to pass through inflation
- Real estate: does well as asset values increase

### **Deflation**

- Cash: low return with approx. 0% interest rate (but ↑ real purchasing power)
- Bonds: attractive as future cash flows have ↑ purchasing power (if no default)
- Equity: does poorly with declining economic activity and asset values
- Real estate: does poorly with declining property values

## Government Policy

### Monetary

- Stimulative (loose): money supply  $\uparrow$ , ST rates  $\downarrow$
- Contractionary (tight): money supply  $\downarrow$ , ST rates  $\uparrow$
- ST rates indirectly affect LT rates

### Fiscal

- Stimulative: deficit  $\uparrow$
- Contractionary: deficit  $\downarrow$
- Budget deficit =  $G - T$
- *Automatic stabilizers* mitigate cyclical fluctuations

Monetary policy crucial in short to medium term (effect on cyclical patterns); fiscal policy key in long run

The **Taylor rule** can be used to *predict the next change in ST rates*:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Real } R_{\text{target}} = & \text{ policy-neutral real ST rate} \\ & + 0.5 (\text{real GDP growth}_{\text{expected}} - \text{real GDP growth}_{\text{trend}}) \\ & + 0.5 (\text{inflation}_{\text{expected}} - \text{inflation}_{\text{target}}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Nominal } R_{\text{target}} = \text{real } R_{\text{target}} + \text{inflation}_{\text{expected}}$$

## Government Policy

### **Negative interest rates**

- Likely associated with deflation and regarded as unsustainable
- Post 2007–2008 great recession, they have persisted, despite quantitative easing (which was expected to have a stimulative effect)
- They complicate economic forecasting, what  $r_f$ ?
  - Use the Taylor rule policy neutral rate?
  - Forecast possible paths to a long-term  $+ r_f$ ?
  - Assume we are in the early recovery stage of the business cycle?

### **Government policy and the yield curve**

#### *Fiscal and monetary policy expansive*

- The economy should improve
- Yield curve sharply upward sloping in anticipation

#### *Fiscal and monetary policy restrictive*

- The economy should contract
- Yield curve downward sloping in anticipation

## International Aspects

### Interactions

- Macroeconomic linkages (lower impact on larger more diversified economies)
  - Current account and capital account linkages  $[(X - M) = (S - I) + (T - G)]$ 
    - Example: tax cut ( $T \downarrow$ )  $\rightarrow \uparrow I \rightarrow \downarrow (X - M)$ —*increase in current a/c deficit and capital a/c surplus (net inward investment)*
    - Growth in other countries likely to increase as the tax cut stimulates demand for their exports, which in turn generates additional demand within their domestic economies
- Interest rate and currency linkages

### Warning signs for emerging markets

1. Irresponsible fiscal and monetary policies: **government deficit/GDP ratio > 4%**
2. Insufficient economic growth: **real growth < 4%**
3. Overvalued currency and twin deficit: **current a/c deficit > 4% of GDP**
4. Excessive foreign-denominated debt: **foreign debt/GDP ratio > 50%**  
**debt/current a/c receipts > 200%**
5. Inadequate short-term liquidity: **foreign currency reserves/ST foreign  
currency debt ratio < 100%**
6. Risky political situation and government policies not supportive of LT growth

## **Capital Market Expectations Part 2: Forecasting Asset Class Returns**

## Forecasting Asset Class Returns

### Statistical methods

- Sample (historical) data
  - Possibly with shrinkage estimate (weighted average of two estimates—one from sample data and other from alternative source (e.g., prior knowledge))
- Time series analysis (e.g., volatility clustering)

### Discounted cash flow

- Equity, Grinold-Kroner: dividend yield + repurchases + nominal earnings growth + repricing (all as %) =  $\left(\frac{D}{P} - \% \Delta S\right) + \% \Delta E + \% \Delta \frac{P}{E}$   
 (Note that  $\% \Delta E - \% \Delta S = \text{growth rate of eps}$ )
- Bonds: YTM, refined using MD and future rate change projections (as seen in FI)

*Useful FI rule of thumb: if holding period (H) = Macaulay duration, then total return little affected by yield changes (immunized); for shorter H, price risk dominates (higher rates bad), and for longer H, reinvestment risk dominates (lower rates bad)*

## Forecasting Asset Class Returns

### Building block approach to FI returns

- Risk-free rate + term premium + credit premium + liquidity premium

### Equilibrium approach

- **Singer-Terhaar model:** weighted-average risk premium, based on degree of integration

- Fully integrated market:

$$RP_i^G = \rho_{i,GM} \left( \frac{RP_{GM}}{\sigma_{GM}} \right) [= \beta_i \times RP_{GM}]$$

Global market Sharpe ratio

- Fully segmented market:

$$RP_i^S = \sigma_i \left( \frac{RP_i^S}{\sigma_i} \right)$$

Segmented market Sharpe ratio; if not told otherwise, assume this is same as global Sharpe ratio

- Plus include premiums for nonsystematic risks such as illiquidity

Also: **surveys** (of group of experts) and **judgment** (synthesis of info from various sources)